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‘Freedom’ is a fundamental political concept: contestations or endorsements of freedom-
conceptions concern the fundamental normative orientation of sociopolitical orders. 
Focusing on 'freedom', this paper argues that the project of bringing about emancipatory 
sociopolitical orders is both aided by efforts at engineering fundamental political concepts as 
well as required by such ameliorative ambitions. I first argue that since the absence of 
ideology is a constituent feature of emancipatory orders, any attempt at bringing about 
emancipation should leverage genealogical approaches in order to debunk existing 
ideological freedom-concepts, which can occur only by exposing the discursive functions 
these have come to serve for the (re-)production of dominant power relations. I then suggest 
that establishing and sustaining an alternative, ideology-free conception of ‘freedom’ is a 
steeper task. Ensuring widespread uptake of any ameliorated concept is contingent on 
effective change in the relevant social environment. Where fundamental political concepts 
such as 'freedom' are concerned, effective intervention in the relevant social environment 
requires radical sociopolitical change. But if such change can be brought about and enables 
the widespread uptake of an ‘improved’ freedom-concept, the concept's content comes to 
reflect changed social facts, thereby stabilising the particular emancipatory sociopolitical 
order which has newly arisen. 
 
 
1 I’d like to thank Vincent Harting, Andrea Sangiovanni, and one anonymous reviewer for EJP for incisive feedback 




This paper examines the relationship between conceptual and political dominance, focusing 
on how socially dominant conceptions of what it means to be ‘free’ are related to the 
hegemonic normativities of sociopolitical orders. Freedom is a major political value, and 
appeals to freedom (or ‘liberty’) abound in political discourse.2 Freedom’s wide-ranging 
political power is well illustrated by the fact that diverse and often contradictory social and 
political movements are built on the motivation of achieving or maintaining ‘freedom’, an 
almost mythical quality often seen as central to living any decent life. Even in a narrow 
context such as the recent and contemporary United States, one can find pertinent examples 
everywhere: from the black struggles of the civil rights movement to the (re-)erection of 
white supremacist orders;3 from desires and organized efforts to curtail or displace the 
power of workplace bosses to anti-union entrepreneurism;4 from anti-gun to pro-gun 
activism;5 pro-vaccination campaigns and vax-sceptical efforts,6 political ideals and 
campaigns are shrouded in the language of freedom.  
History at-large is littered with such conflicts about what it means to be free, and who 
should get to be free.7 Throughout intellectual history, theorists have often argued that 
freedom, while conceptually open-ended, is better understood as one thing rather than 
another: say, as the absence of outside restraint or interference, the capacity to master one’s 
 
2 In this paper, I shall be exclusively concerned with the social dimensions of ‘freedom’, i.e., freedom as a value 
arising in the context of our relations to others (as opposed to, say, metaphysical questions about the existence 
of a ‘free’ will). This kind of freedom is often termed ‘liberty’; this essay takes the two terms to be synonymous. 
3 Compare, for example: Martin Luther King, Jr, Letter from a Birmingham Jail, 1963, Available at: 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (Accessed: 21/12/2021) and George C. 
Wallace, Inaugural address for Governor of Alabama, 1963, Available at: 
https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/collection/voices/id/2952 (Accessed: 21/12/2021). Also consider 
the story told in Tyler Stovall, White Freedom: The Racial History of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2021), p. 313-319. 
4 For example, compare Barry Eidlin and Micah Uetricht, “Freedom From the Boss”, Jacobin Online 2018, 
Available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/01/freedom-from-the-boss (Accessed: 21/12/2021) and 
Gary G. Galles, “Unions are Clearly in the Wrong about Freedom of Association, Foundation for Economic 
Education 2020, Available at: https://fee.org/articles/unions-are-clearly-in-the-wrong-about-freedom-of-
association/ (Accessed: 21/12/2021). 
5 Compare Jay Stanley, “A Pro-Liberty Case for Gun Restrictions”, American Civil Liberties Union 2018, 
Available at: https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/pro-liberty-case-gun-restrictions (Accessed: 
21/12/2021) and Wayne LaPierre, “Standing Guard | Freedom Rests On Our Shoulders”, NRA: America’s 1st 
Freedom 2020, Available at: https://www.americas1stfreedom.org/articles/2020/12/22/standing-guard-
freedom-rests-on-our-shoulders (Accessed: 21/12/2021). 
6 Compare Shannon Casas, “Column: I’ve got my ticket to freedom”, The Gainesville Times 2021, Available at: 
https://www.gainesvilletimes.com/columnists/shannon-casas/column-ive-got-my-ticket-to-freedom/ 
(Accessed: 21/12/2021) and Eleanor Langford, “Ticket To Normal Life Or Threat to Freedom? Why 
Coronavirus ‘Vaccination Passports’ Might Not Be A Simple Way Forward, PoliticsHome 2020, Available at: 
https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/coronavirus-vaccine-passport-immunity-lockdown-normal-life-
threat-to-freedom (Accessed: 21/12/2021). 




desires in accordance with higher ends, the state of being part of a self-governing political 
community, of being enabled to live in conditions in which we can genuinely and mutually 
recognise our dependence on one another as persons, or of being subjected to no one’s 
arbitrary power or uncontrolled interference (et cetera).8 Importantly, such visions of freedom 
are not separate from political efforts – explicitly or implicitly, those who espouse them 
make the case that such ideals can only be realized in specific political orders, or at least that 
they are irreconcilable with a certain kind or kinds of political order. Broadly speaking (and 
in a simplified manner), certain conceptions of freedom are then taken to animate or justify, 
inter alia, liberal, libertarian, (neo-)republican, socialist, or other political projects.9 
It may not be too surprising, then, that radical changes in the political landscapes of 
Western societies have often been closely linked to conceptual ruptures in the dominant 
understandings of ‘freedom’. That is, one understanding of freedom was widespread in the 
ancient Greek and Roman republics, another in the theocratic monarchies of the medieval 
ages; one in the period of the American and French revolutions; another in the restorative 
and reactionary circumstances that followed; and so on.10 This interlinking of conceptual 
and political change suggests that, where societies express sociopolitical claims in the 
language of freedom, there is a structural interconnection between which conceptions of 
freedom dominate and which kinds of political orders are hegemonic. But what is the precise 
nature of this connection? Which role does the character of one’s sociopolitical order play in 
determining what ‘freedom’ means for a society? And, inversely, which role do widespread 
conceptions of ‘freedom’ play in determining the character of one’s sociopolitical order? 
Historians are not the only ones who should be interested in the answers to such questions. 
Most importantly, real-world agents of change, such as social movements and political 
parties, have a vested interest in the relations between concepts and politics. For them as 
well, the question of the directionality between political and conceptual change is an 
important one. Can they effect change by redefining established interpretations of concepts 
which express widely shared moral or political sentiments? Or can they only get to 
 
8 See, for instance and respectively, Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); Ambrose, Letters, trans. Mary Melchior Beyenka (New York: 
Fathers of the Church, 1954), p. 287-99; Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Robin Waterfield, ed. Carolyn Dewald 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Martin Hägglund, This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2019); Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
9 See for instance John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, John M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963-91), Vol XVIII, p. 213-310; 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Pettit, Republicanism; Hägglund, This 
Life; William Clare Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2016). 
10 De Dijn, Freedom. 
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conceptual change via radical political change? And if so, is conceptual change still a 
valuable objective? 
This paper approaches these questions in the tradition of progressive conceptual analysis, 
and shall thus mainly be interested in the interplay between conceptions of ‘freedom’ and the 
aim of bringing about emancipatory sociopolitical orders. However, I stop short of proposing 
or endorsing any comprehensive account of emancipation, insisting only that emancipatory 
orders cannot be ideological (in a pejorative sense) or sustained by or productive of such 
ideological discourse.11 Since, on these grounds, emancipatory goals are irreconcilable with 
the operation of ideological freedom-discourse, I argue that any emancipatory critique aimed 
at understanding the interconnections between dominant conceptual practice and hegemonic 
political orders should begin by leveraging genealogical approaches in order to debunk 
current freedom-concepts that play ideological roles, which can occur only by exposing the 
discursive functions they have come to serve for the (re-)production of dominant power 
relations.12 Non-ideologically establishing and sustaining an alternative conception of 
‘freedom’ considered more desirable from our own point of view, however, is a steeper task. 
Due to the externalist ways in which meaning (presumably) comes into being and 
proliferates, abolishing ideologically tainted freedom-discourse by redefining its content in 
non-ideological terms and ensuring widespread uptake of this newly engineered concept is 
contingent on large-scale, transformative change in the relevant social environment: 
transformative sociopolitical change. But once such change has enabled the widespread 
uptake of an ‘improved’ freedom-concept, its content comes to reflect changed social facts, 
and thereby serves to stabilise any emancipatory sociopolitical order arising from this 
change. The relation between successfully established emancipatory freedom-concepts and 
emancipatory sociopolitical orders is, then, one of mutual constitution. Or so I shall argue. 
 
11 I provide a more extensive discussion of ‘pejorative ideology’ in the next section. For now, it is enough to 
point out that such ideology supports or stabilities power relations by reproducing epistemic faults – lies, 
misconceptions, and so on. Such ideology is irreconcilable with emancipation because it precludes persons from 
consenting to relations of power on reasonable grounds – instead deploying power to actively manufacture the 
very consent sought in the first place –, while emancipation is fundamentally in the business of displacing (in 
some significant sense) illegitimate power relations. For background on the irreconcilability of such ideology 
and emancipation, see Bernard Williams’s ‘Critical Theory Principle’, according to which “the acceptance of a 
justification does not count if the acceptance has been produced by the coercive power which is supposedly 
being justified”: Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, ed. 
Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), at p. 6. For more extensive discussion, see 
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 219-232. 
12 Matthieu Queloz calls this “pragmatic genealogy”, a method consisting “in telling partly fictional, partly 
historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to explore what 
these ideas do for us.” Thus, we investigate the emergence and persistence of terms through an examination of 
their historical functions, “by reconstructing the practical problems that these ideas offer solutions to”. 
Matthieu Queloz, The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2021), at p. 2 and p. 3. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the pejorative understanding of 
ideology, explains how ‘freedom’-discourse can be ideological in terms of discrepancies 
between manifest and operative concepts, and argues for genealogical debunking as the 
necessary first step in battling such ideology. Section III considers the possibilities for 
establishing non-ideological freedom-discourse in society through the frame of semantic 
externalism, arguing that we can indeed change what ‘freedom’ means, but that the success 
of any such endeavour is contingent on a radical transformation of society. Section IV argues 
that this does not render freedom-amelioration pointless, because pursuing and maintaining 
an ameliorated freedom-concept is essential for the long-term project of building a stable, 
emancipatory sociopolitical order; and suggests that ideology-critical theory can aid 
emancipatory change by helping identify and support suitable agents of change. Section V 
addresses the problem of ‘ideology creep’ – that purportedly emancipatory agents and orders 
might themselves fall back into the (re-)production of ideological discourse in the face of 
contestation –, suggesting that a notion of emancipation which centres ideology-awareness 
ought to be coupled with prefiguring society-wide transformative change with smaller-scale 
experiments to counteract this danger. Section VI briefly concludes. 
 
II. 
Different conceptions of freedom motivate different political projects, and ‘freedom’ thus has 
a significant role in structuring political narratives and potentials, and may serve to 
perpetuate some lifestyles, interests, and social visions while disadvantaging and 
marginalising others. The ways in which ‘freedom’ serves as a prism through which we 
experience and come to understand different aspects of the world can be helpfully 
interpreted as ideological, in at least two crucial ways. First, conceptualizations of what it 
means to be free are abstract models which “people use to represent and cope with the social 
world”.13 On this understanding, ideological models help us simplify the more complex 
realities of the social world, the ways in which values interact, clash and inform behaviours 
and practical outcomes, and so on. Akin to notions such as ‘liberalism’, ‘conservatism’, or 
‘socialism’, on this understanding, conceptions of freedom help us approximate the complex 
mechanics of social and political life and provide us with simplified, yet valuable ways to 
clarify to ourselves where we stand in relation to this life, and which of its aspects and forces 
 
13 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. xx. 
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we can identify with. This is a purely descriptive, non-evaluative understanding of ideology, 
and ideology thus understood is central to any notion of society and politics. 
However, there is also a distinctly pejorative view of the concept – a view on which it 
describes something bad. Here, ‘ideology’ picks out only such representations and models of 
the world, forms of social consciousness, or simply beliefs which represent it falsely or 
undesirably. Inter alia, such accounts hold ideology to “mask problematic features of our 
world, or cast those features in a misleadingly positive light, or lack the normative concepts 
needed to identify what is problematic about them, or misrepresent the space of possibilities 
so as to obscure better options, the means to realizing them, or their merits”;14 represent 
“epistemically flawed, rational revision-resistant belief”;15 represent pervasively false beliefs 
which “have the function of sustaining (and are in turn sustained by) systems of social 
oppression”;16 or “fail to provide us with the tools to appreciate parts of the world, or what’s 
valuable and how things are valuable”.17 Second, then, understandings of freedom may 
operate in such ideologically bad ways. For the purposes of this paper, I adopt a rather thin 
definition which abstains from casting the function of ideology in moralized terms: 
ideological representations, beliefs, meanings, forms of social consciousness, and so on, are 
those which are epistemically faulty (or rely on epistemically faulty components) and, in 
virtue of these epistemic flaws, function to sustain operative power relations between agents. 
Such an understanding of ideology centres on its purpose of stabilising power relations 
through pervasive distortion without the need for a prior moralized assessment of whether 
the stabilised power relations are, say, oppressive. It thus allows us to use the ideal of 
ideology-free justificatory processes as a benchmark not only for evaluating the prevailing 
power relations we want to also criticize on moralized grounds, but also to keep a check on 
our own projects of consolidating supposedly morally more desirable – say, what we 
conceive of as ‘liberating’ – forms of power relations.18 Where the implementation or 
reproduction of any sociopolitical order is built on pervasive epistemic distortion, it fails to 
meet the basic conditions of any proper justificatory process.19 
 
14 Anderson, Private Government, p. xxi 
15 Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi, “Political realism as ideology critique”, Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, 20:3 (2017), 348-65, at p. 359. See also Jason Stanley, How Propaganda Works 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
16 Amia Srinivasan, “Radical Externalism”, The Philosophical Review, 129:3 (2020), p. 395-431, at p. 407. 
17 Sally Haslanger, “Going on, Not in the Same Way”, Anthony Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David 
Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 230-60, 
at p. 232. 
18 This shall interest us further in section V. 
19 See again Williams’s ‘Critical Theory Principle’ in Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, p. 219-232; see also Rainer Forst, 
“Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice”, Metaphilosophy 32:1/2 (2001), at p. 168. 
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I am here mainly interested in how ‘freedom’-concepts can be significantly complicit in 
developing, upholding, and reproducing pejoratively ideological discourse. As we can glean 
from the preceding section, some conceptions of freedom may quite plausibly be understood 
to carry and perpetuate such discourse. Arguably, for instance, theological conceptions of 
freedom have elevated epistemically questionable beliefs in order to naturalize ordinary 
people’s social and political subordination to unaccountable governance. Considering the 
prominent standing of the concept for social discourses and political visions, both 
historically and presently, and its omnipresent status as a sometimes-elusive object of almost 
universal desire, it seems quite plausible to think that freedom is a concept particularly 
susceptible to becoming corrupted by ideological takeover. Certainly, those striving for 
power would seem to have much to gain by co-opting ‘freedom’ to bring widespread notions 
of what it means to live a free life in line with their partisan visions; be they based on 
epistemically accurate stories or not. ‘Freedom’, then, is vulnerable to be filled with 
epistemically problematic content in order to play central roles in the facilitation of 
hegemonic power relations. Since laying bare the ideological constructs which permeate 
public consciousness is a primary aim of critical theory, we should ask which tools ideology 
critics might have to combat any dominant ideological understandings of a concept so 
central to collective life as ‘freedom’.  
One way to understand how concepts of social import carry and perpetuate ideology is to 
look at significant and ubiquitous differences between what people take themselves to refer to 
when using a concept and the actual meanings the concept has come to represent in people’s 
linguistic and social communities. On an externalist framework of semantics, we are not 
directly in charge of meanings taken on by concepts and other representational devices. 
Instead, the meanings of our concepts are at least partly determined by the external 
environment in which we find ourselves, which includes, among other things, “experts in the 
community, the history of use going back to the introduction of a term, complex patterns of 
use over time”.20 In other words, when it comes to the generation and interpretation of 
shared meanings, “our social and natural environments serve as heavy anchors”.21 This 
means that it is possible for us to disseminate meanings different from those we intended to 
refer to when engaging in speech acts, since we cannot unilaterally decide the content 
 
20 Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp, “Conceptual Innovation, Function First”, Noûs (2019). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12302, p. 9-10. Semantic externalism remains contested by semantic internalism, 
which denies that meaning is necessarily shaped by the external world. However, as conceptual engineering or 
amelioration becomes but a non-issue on a semantic internalist framework, the crucial challenge for my 
argument about freedom-amelioration is to retain plausibility even in the event that the more challenging 
framework of semantic externalism is true. 
21 Anthony Burgess and David Plunkett, “Conceptual ethics I”, Philosophy Compass, 8:12 (2013), p. 1091-1101, 
at p. 1096 
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represented by terms and concepts. In an ideological environment, by using terms we 
ourselves might take to be innocuous and straightforward in an unreflective manner, we can 
unwittingly conspire to reproduce what they in fact signify as the products of external 
meaning coinage. This is why, for example and notwithstanding our own intentions and 
personal beliefs about the meanings of the term, we cannot go around labelling the heavy 
use of make-up and adherence to a strict and narrow set of beauty standards ‘womanly’ 
without thereby reproducing the pernicious stereotypes of patriarchal ideology.  
On this view, thus, it is not entirely in our control which values and meanings we proliferate 
when we speak of things such as ‘freedom’. We can further develop this line of thought by 
following Sally Haslanger and making a critical distinction between manifest and operative 
concepts.22 Often, when ordinary language users use terms uncritically, they contribute to a 
naturalisation process: they either take themselves to be referring to natural kinds or use 
terms in a way which supports the naturalising interpretations of others (or both) – the 
manifest concept –, even when what they really refer to is better understood as a contingent 
result constructed by particular constellations of social relations – the operative concept. 
Some operative concepts may be relatively innocuous (Haslanger provides the example of 
‘cool’), whereas others carry ideology (consider ‘race’). To combat ideology, we require a 
sustained effort at exposing the discrepancies between manifest and operative concepts; that 
is, we must debunk the idea that the manifest and operative concepts are one and the same, 
trace the operative concept’s social origins, and explain what social functions it fulfils.23 This 
is meant to be an analytical epistemic effort at understanding what concepts convey in their 
social contexts, and what roles their histories have made them play in social practice.24 To 
clarify this, it is worth quoting in full Prinz and Rossi’s explication of one of Haslanger’s 
examples: 
[…] Haslanger shows that generic statements such as ‘blacks are criminals’ are used in a way 
that reflects a specific form of knowledge, embedded in a web of schemata and resources in which 
they are true. However, such generic statements are misleading at the same time. They seem to 
be making a claim about the nature of an object/set of persons [the manifest concept, note] when 
the claim in fact is about its/their socially and historically developed position in the requisite social 
order [the operative concept, note].25 
 
22 For example, at Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 92-94. 
23 Cf. Haslanger, Resisting Reality; Haslanger, “Going on, Not in the Same Way”. 
24 Cf. Prinz and Rossi, “Political realism”, p. 358-360 
25 Prinz and Rossi, “Political realism”, at p. 358. 
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‘Blacks are criminals’ does not convey an empirical truth, but really reproduces an 
ideologically loaded history of social relations. Ameliorative conceptual analysis, then, must 
begin by making use of historical investigations in order to provide genealogical insights 
about how the purported naturalizations of manifest concepts have come to be constructed, 
and what this process of construction itself tells us about historical power relations between 
the relevant agents. We need to know not only if or that a statement is an empirically false 
locution, but what function its construction plays in historically situated and developed 
social relations. Indeed, to know if some locution is not merely false, but perhaps instead a 
socially constructed naturalization with ideological function, we need to investigate its 
relation to power relations, which are inevitably situated in sociohistorical context. In this 
sense, ideology critique counteracts the power of ideological discourse to leave operative 
concepts obscured and reproduce the fantasy that there is only the truth of the manifest 
concept, by attempting to dismantle “hegemonic naturalizations”.26  
We can counter the potential of hidden ideology in ubiquitous referrals to ‘freedom’, then, by 
paying close attention and genealogically reconstructing which picture of power relations 
such referrals convey, and by making ourselves aware of their entanglements with particular 
interests and valuational hegemonies.27 While ‘freedom’ might seem to some of us as obvious 
a social construct as it gets, it is arguable that its ubiquitous deployment in social discourse 
and political debate aims at entrenching particular notions as ‘common sense’, thereby 
attempting to naturalize them, whilst simultaneously obscuring contentious political 
presuppositions and agendas, and that this process relies significantly on epistemically 
dubious legitimation stories. An ideology-critical approach to ‘freedom’ must investigate 
these hunches more thoroughly, debunk the construction of false equivalences between 
manifest and operative concepts, and provide critical evaluations of the operative concept’s 
history and functions. 
 
III. 
So much for critical diagnosis of prevailing, ideological freedom-conceptions. But, presuming 
that the prevailing meanings of freedom are somehow importantly linked to the normative 
character of the dominant sociopolitical order, can we appropriate the political power of 
freedom-discourse for our own desired political ends without rendering it ideological once 
 
26 Ibid, 357; Haslanger, Resisting Reality, at p. 448-449. 
27 For a recent account of the values of genealogy for political philosophy, including its value for the political 
critique of ideology, see Janosch Prinz and Paul Raekstad, “The value of genealogies for political philosophy”, 
Inquiry (2020). DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1762729. See also Queloz, The Practical Origins of Ideas. 
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again, thereby undercutting the basic conditions of emancipation? That is, can we replace the 
manifest meanings of people’s freedom-talk with content suited for aiding and sustaining our 
own ends without producing obscured operative concepts or relying on epistemically faulty 
legitimation stories ourselves? Can we bring about what we might consider a truly liberating 
change in what it means to be free whilst sustaining the justificatory conditions of 
emancipation? 
This question connects the diagnostic side of ameliorative conceptual analysis with its more 
proactive engineering aspect, on which we not only assess concepts, but endeavour to fix 
those which are evidently broken (as in, for instance, confused, unsatisfiable, too inclusive, 
too narrow, or nonsensical),28 and try to improve those we think could do better work in 
aiding “our legitimate purposes”, by adjusting their intensions and extensions.29 One reason 
we might have to improve concepts is that we take them to have “morally, politically, or 
socially detrimental effects” which could be inversed and made fit to serve more desirable 
ends. This is, ex hypothesi, what we discovered to be the case in our previous hypothetical 
ameliorative analysis. 
But let’s consider first if there might be reason to be cautious about a project quite as brazen 
as engineering ‘freedom’ in the sense of replacing its current representational contents with 
whatever we see fit, even besides the danger of falling back into the creation and 
perpetuation of ideological beliefs and narratives. A first concern asks: are we not wilfully 
eliminating crucial knowledge about the world by engaging in conceptual engineering, and 
would this not give us epistemic reason to abandon this effort? Mona Simion thinks 
engineering projects can be justified on the condition that they do not lead to epistemic loss: 
“A representational device should be ameliorated iff (1) There is all-things-considered reason 
to do so and (2) The amelioration does not translate into epistemic loss”.30 This condition 
aims to preclude wrong-kind-of-reasons amelioration. After all, concepts seem to be 
essentially epistemic devices whose basic function is to enable us to grasp true features of the 
world. So, abandoning “a semantically impeccable, joint-carving, practically non-deficient 
concept” just because doing so would yield all-things-considered, non-epistemic advantages 
for us would never improve a concept qua concept. For instance, Simion argues, a concept 
 
28 Mona Simion, “The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering”, Inquiry, 61: 8 (2018), 914-28, at p. 916. She is 
quoting Patrick Greenough, Against Conceptual Engineering (Book Manuscript, 2017), at p. 3. For a general and 
pioneering account of conceptual engineering, see Herman Cappelen, Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual 
Engineering (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). 
29 Haslanger, “Going on, Not in the Same Way”, at p. 230. In semantics, “’intension’ indicates the internal 
content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal definition; and ‘extension’ indicates its range of 
applicability by naming the particular objects that it denotes”. Britannica, Intension and extension, Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/intension (Accessed: 21/12/2021). 
30 Simion, “The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering”, at p. 923. 
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like ‘deer’, which we stipulate to carve nature at its biological joints, would not become a 
better concept if we revised it to exclude a subset of its appropriate extensions on the 
motivation that doing so “would improve the life expectancy of bumblebees, which, given 
that bumblebees pollinate crops, would, in turn, result in economic advantages”.31 Despite 
the socioeconomic advantages, abandoning the joint-carving concept would entail epistemic 
loss, while the most basic function of concepts is to enable epistemic gains. But ideology 
critique is, in a sense, precisely about epistemic loss. After all, we want to abandon a certain 
ideological conceptual practice and change what people take a concept to refer to. Is this 
effort not, then, in direct violation of Simion’s desiderata?32 
The way out of this problem is to take seriously the distinction between natural kind 
concepts such as ‘deer’ and social kind concepts such as ‘freedom’. Natural kind concepts 
target the world’s non-social ontological makeup; that is, they aim to capture what is there 
independent of social realities. This is why, when we engineer away from an already joint-
carving natural kind concept, we face epistemic loss: something that enabled us to grasp as 
much of reality as possible is gone, and it will not come back unless we reverse our 
engineering efforts.33 However, and to the contrary, social kind concepts such as ‘woman’ or 
‘freedom’ themselves play an important role in determining social reality. Since social kind 
concepts by definition pick out and specify phenomena that arise from within contexts of 
human relations, they are properly revised when such contexts change. And since the 
operative meanings of concepts themselves play a significant role in shaping the state of our 
social relations and contexts, engineering them does not need to involve permanent 
epistemic loss.34 Consider:  
If woman is engineered so as to exclude features about women being better caretakers than men, 
then, while there is an initial loss of knowledge, eventually, after the concept has received 
significant uptake, women will not be treated as better caretakers than men. Facts about social 
reality will change. And hence, the concept woman will accurately represent this.35 
We can thus engineer social kind concepts without suffering (permanent) epistemic loss 
precisely because successful engineering will itself render the concept’s representational 
content accurate over time. It may be alleged, however, that such engineering may yet entail 
a different kind of epistemic loss. While a successfully implanted ‘freedom’ concept will come 
to reflect lived social normativity and thus appropriately track social reality, ensuring that 
 
31 Ibid, at p. 921 
32 Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky, “Ideology and normativity: constraints on conceptual engineering”, Inquiry 
(2018). DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562374. 
33 Ibid, p. 8-10. 
34 Ibid, p. 9-11. 
35 Ibid, at p. 9 
12 
 
there is no epistemic mismatch between language and social reality, it may be the case that a 
newly engineered freedom concept is simply bad, in that it is unreasonable, fails to accord 
entirely with our normative intuitions about related concepts, is contradictory so that it 
cannot provide coherent-action guidance, or exhibits other clear defects.36 In such cases, we 
might suffer permanent epistemic loss in the sense that we lose knowledge of the reasonable 
purposes freedom concepts have played in structuring social relations: our conceptual 
repertoire is being corrupted by meanings which have no similarity with or purpose for 
people’s reasonable interests or experiences. We are thus in danger of losing knowledge 
about the proper baseline function of a concept itself. To avert this danger, critics may say, 
engineering efforts should proceed only where it can be shown that the newly proposed 
conceptual content satisfies some criteria of conceptual reasonableness or justifiability.  
This is an important worry that I cannot entirely displace, not least because there is no way 
for me here to discuss or postulate such criteria of reasonableness or justifiability in a way 
that is not fatally ad-hoc and arbitrary. However, it seems to me that to generate the popular 
appeal necessary to successfully establish a proposed change in the conceptual content of 
‘freedom’, such a concept would have to relevantly relate to the experiences and interests of 
a great many people, and seems therefore unable to avoid meeting some suitable criterion of 
conceptual reasonableness or justifiability. Malicious efforts at circumventing such a process 
of justification – forcing or manufacturing non-genuine consent to conceptual uptake - 
appear themselves to necessarily involve either or both unbridled authoritarianism, the 
legitimacy of which we can deny on independent normative grounds, and/or recurse to 
ideological methods that distort the justificatory process with misleading narratives, which 
would disqualify the engineering effort on the epistemic grounds of my own view.37 The 
upshot is that the epistemic worry formulated above becomes salient only in independently 
objectionable sociopolitical circumstances. Insofar as we are committed to standards of social 
justification stressing authority- and ideology-free processes – which a conceptual engineer 
animated by an ideology-critical mindset should anyways be – we therefore have yet to 
discover a good epistemic reason to refrain from ameliorating an ideologically tainted 
‘freedom’ concept.  
 
36 Think of the Orwellian conceptual engineering by which freedom is slavery. The general worry here is brought out 
well in Matthieu Queloz and Friedemann Bieber, “Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation”, 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2021), doi.org/10.1111/papq.12394, p. 6-9. 
37 As Queloz and Bieber make clear in their “Conceptual Engineering”, the notion that it would be desirable to 
implement well-engineered concepts with ease should make us wary of the political mechanisms required to change 
people’s conceptual repertoires with relatively little difficulty or pushback. The idea that wide uptake of an 
engineered concept with a general social function (such as ‘freedom’) is legitimately induced only by an authority- 
and ideology-free social process of justification is positively complementary to their negative account of the 
normative factors counselling against establishing a machinery which could ensure easy conceptual implementation. 
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Another strong reason to refrain from engaging in the active engineering of ‘freedom’ might 
be provided by the charge that such efforts are infeasible, that is, that our engineering efforts 
cannot ensure the representational accuracy of our newly minted concept.38 In such cases, 
engineering efforts might only produce confusion, and in general, there is every reason to 
think that our efforts are ill-spent on infeasible projects. But why should it be infeasible to 
engineer ‘freedom’? If other examples of social kind concepts are any guide, there does not 
seem prima facie reason to believe such a project to be infeasible. ‘Marriage’ (or its equivalent 
in different languages), for example, is a social kind concept that has been successfully 
engineered in many linguistic communities, now including in its extensions previously 
barred same-sex relationships of the right kind. 
The reasons why we may seriously doubt the feasibility of ‘freedom’-engineering becomes 
clearer once we realize that ‘freedom’ is not merely a social kind concept. Where the 
language of freedom has purchase on the sociopolitical claims society members make on each 
other, it is also, and perhaps primarily, a fundamental political concept.39 Under such 
circumstances, politics always negotiates the concerns of freedom, directly or indirectly. That 
is, such politics involves all, combinations of, or either of the following: (I) disputes over the 
proper meaning of the concept itself, (ii) disputes about which concrete individual pursuits 
can or should be deemed valuable by particular meanings, (iii) disputes over specific policies 
which are at least in part proxies for debates about the underlying understandings of 
freedom, or (iv) concerted (and often contentious) efforts to enable widely shared 
conceptions of freedom to flourish. These processes of contestation and/or enablement do not 
simply involve the changing political matters of the day, but ultimately negotiate the basics 
not only of the proper relationship between the governed and the governors, but also 
between the governed themselves. Thereby, they shape the fundamental normative orientation 
of a system of social relations. It is important to add that I do not claim here that freedom is 
the only fundamental political concept, or even a particularly distinctive one; such a claim 
would be unnecessarily contentious. As implied by my introductory remarks, it seems to me 
that there is indeed some tacit historical evidence that the concept of freedom has been 
particularly persistent as a transtemporal organizer-concept for politically organized 
societies, to extents that surpass the persistence of rival ‘core’ political concepts such as 
 
38 Ibid, p. 13. 
39 My conception of ‘fundamental political concepts’ is evocative of the pioneering exploration of essentially 
contested concepts given by W.B. Gallie in his W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), 167-98. Though this would need further argument, I do not take ‘freedom’ to be 
an essentially contested concept in his sense, at the very least because it seems to me that it does not meet 
Gallie’s sixth condition (and therefore also his seventh), which prescribes that a candidate concept must derive 
“from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept” (Ibid, 
at p. 180). 
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‘justice’ or ‘equality’.40 But this need not be true for my argument to work. Those who 
believe that other concepts (like justice or equality) are fundamental political concepts as 
well, or allege that freedom is not a fundamentally political concept while other concepts are, 
are in principle free to plug their favoured concepts into my analysis. The general lesson is 
simply that the negotiation of ‘freedom’ (perhaps along with such concepts as ‘justice’ or 
‘equality’) concerns the most general level of political normativity, from which our 
evaluative approaches to more narrow and particular issues of political conflict often follow 
(e.g., whether or not we should mandate vaccination passports, or whether or not a rise in 
capital gains tax is a good idea). Understanding ‘freedom’ in this way creates serious worries 
about the feasibility of freedom-amelioration. Ameliorating fundamental political concepts 
seems to differ in important ways from ameliorating other social kind concepts. 
A helpful way to understand why and how they differ and why this seems to pose serious 
feasibility problems for our ameliorative efforts is to consider a recent rebuttal of 
‘contemporary’ ideology critique, and to show that this argument only sticks to concepts and 
practices which are much ‘narrower’ than what attempts at freedom-amelioration try to 
accomplish. To understand how this critique gets off the ground, consider that, insofar as we 
want to engineer a given ‘freedom’-concept, the externalist picture on which we operate 
forces us to acknowledge that we first need to effect a change in the environment in which 
‘freedom’ takes on meaning. Turning back to our earlier example, if we want the concept 
‘woman’ to stop containing the hegemonic naturalization that women are better caretakers, 
we must shape the linguistic and behavioural environment of the ‘woman’ concept in such a 
way that it is no longer functional for the concept’s intension to contain gendered 
hierarchies of caretaking capabilities. The contents of our manifest concepts are functional in 
the sense that they can be explained by considering the roles they might play for satisfying 
the specific needs generated within particular social environments. So, as Simion and Kelp 
point out, to engineer concepts we must pursue “strategic interventions in the relevant 
habitat” to effect changes in the social environment in and through which the meanings of 
concepts take shape.41 
But according to the critique referred to above, ideology critique has nothing valuable to tell 
us about how we can overcome ‘ideological’ concepts and constructs, because it cannot tell 
us anything distinctly helpful about how we effect the strategic interventions in relevant 
 
40 De Dijn, Freedom; also David Kelly and Anthony Reid (eds.), Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast 
Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Michael Neocosmos, Thinking Freedom in Africa: Toward a 
theory of emancipatory politics (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2016). 
41 Simion and Kelp, “Conceptual Innovation”, at p. 12 
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habitats which make social (and conceptual) change possible.42 This argument, levelled by 
Kirun Sankaran, proceeds in three steps.  
First, Sankaran sets aside the pejorative connotations of ‘ideology’ to reconceptualize the 
phenomenon on a purely descriptive level, arguing that ideologies are conventions: equilibria 
solutions for social coordination problems. As such, they serve the function of stably 
enabling coordinated action to the mutual benefit of some actors. But because they serve 
their function successfully, to change conventions, some sort of strategic intervention in the 
environment which necessitates them is needed. Sankaran’s second step is to argue that the 
kind of ideology critique which refuses to engage with empirical evidence and strategies 
(which, he conjectures, is indeed characteristic of ‘contemporary’ ideology critique) has no 
tools to bring about conventional change. Such ideology critique essentially rests on the 
assertion that “[i]f people are exposed to the ways in which their engagement with the 
world is distorted, and the ways in which those distortions have pernicious downstream 
casual effects, […] they will stop acting in ways that maintain pernicious social 
arrangements”.43 But this is to “systematically ignore the role strategic considerations play 
in driving and preventing social change [which] leads to an impoverished account of how 
social change works”.44 The empirical social sciences, instead, have brought forward 
convincing explanations for the causes of social stasis and elaborated strategies to bring 
about social change, as Sankaran shows at the example of Mackie’s seminal, empirically-
driven explanations for variations in the trajectories of (arguably ideological) practices such 
as female genital mutilation (FGM) and ‘footbinding’.45 Sankaran’s third step is to argue that 
even if ideology critics could overcome this ineptness by beginning to pay due attention to 
empirical insights on conventional change, they would simply reinvent “the wheel, poorly”.46 
Social scientific accounts of changes in the content of social conventions are sufficiently rich 
to do all the diagnostic work ideology-critique aspires to supply – providing a sophisticated 
theory of the entrenchment of functional social conventions - and can top this off with 
sophisticated accounts of the mechanics of social change. In sum, ideology critique is either 
ill-equipped to do its job or, alternatively, pitifully superfluous. 
 
42 Kirun Sankaran, “What’s new in the new ideology critique?”, Philosophical Studies, 177 (2020), 1441-1462. 
43 Ibid, at p. 1449. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Cf. ibid, 1450-1453. See also Gerry Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account”, 
American Sociological Review, 61:6 (1996), 999-1017; Gerry Mackie, “Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of 
the End”, Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds.), Female Circumcision in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and 
Change (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000), p. 253-281. 
46 Sankaran, “What’s new in the new ideology critique”, at p. 1453. 
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Even if we grant Sankaran’s point that ideologies are conventions (equilibria solutions for 
social coordination problems), the case of ‘freedom’ shows that his complete deference to 
social scientific solutions to bring about social change can be inadequate. The ‘positive’ side 
of freedom-amelioration – the bringing about of a widespread, sustained change in what 
people take themselves to mean when they refer to ‘freedom’ – is not capturable by the terms 
of Sankaran’s critique, which are limited to assessing the sort of conventional change 
occurring through clear-cut interventions into micro- (or meso-) level practices and 
discourses with a somewhat determined set of characteristics. ‘Freedom’, as a fundamental 
political concept, must be understood as a fundamental value according to whose dominant 
conceptions social relations become organized, and whose fault-lines underpin the very 
practice of political contest. If shared understandings of freedom are conventions that 
coordinate behaviour, then they are better understood as conventions that form part of the 
discursive ground rules of organized society; ground rules that structure and condition, yet 
do not by themselves determine, what is worth striving for. When it comes to constructing 
substantive specifications of ‘freedom’, then, there is no (specific) coordination problem to 
solve: rather, what is at stake are the basic contours of a societal normativity. But this also 
means that the external ‘habitat’ in which we must eventually strategically intervene if we 
are to facilitate lasting and wide-spread take-up of our proposed ameliorative change of 
‘freedom’ is societal discourse at large. Transcending issue-arenas and the particular 
domains of problem-oriented social coordination, the social change needed for freedom-
amelioration is a matter of transforming society’s underlying normative frame. In other 
words, it is a matter of deep and radical social change. But there are no state-of-the-art social 
scientific accounts which help us uncover how to go about the mechanics of radical social 
transformation. To ameliorate ‘freedom’, we must radically alter the sociopolitical status 
quo, and we must ourselves find out how to do so in the process. 
 
IV. 
We are now in a better position to understand why freedom-amelioration might fall prey to 
feasibility concerns. If the amelioration of ‘freedom’ qua fundamental political concept 
requires us to radically change our society’s normative frame and thereby necessitates us to 
transform the reigning sociopolitical landscape, infeasibility seems to loom large. Indeed, if 
freedom-amelioration is ultimately tied to a sea change in the political landscape of a 
sociolinguistic community, the idea of pursuing it may seem preposterous. But I suggest that 
this is not due to feasibility problems. High hurdles and the unlikelihood of success do not 
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equate infeasibility. Such a stance is clearly contradicted by the many deliberately effected 
large-scale political transformations which have occurred in human history. Conceding 
infeasibility would not only be premature; it would also be insulting to those who spend 
their lives in pursuit of radical change (and sometimes achieve it).  
The problem, instead, is that the whole endeavour now seems pointless. Insofar as we not 
only want to debunk ideological narratives, but also want to change the meaning of concepts 
in virtue of conceptual change’s importance for the facilitation of emancipatory social 
change, our engineering efforts seem a fool’s errand. If, as the preceding discussion has 
suggested, our engineering efforts cannot be successful before emancipatory change has 
been achieved on its own, and emancipatory change is the ultimate purpose anyways, we 
should refocus our efforts on formulating appropriate strategies to effect social change and 
on putting these strategies into action; freedom-amelioration is a distraction. 
If this is right, ideology critique’s transformational purchase on a fundamental political 
concept like ‘freedom’ is limited to its diagnostic task of exposing ideological discourse via 
genealogical inquiry, debunking prevalent naturalizations, the distortions on which they 
rest, and their power-stabilising functions for all to see. This could in itself have a 
disenchanting effect on people and thus prove valuable for political mobilisation,47 but is 
ultimately an unsatisfying response to Sankaran’s charge that ideology critique itself is 
unhelpful for identifying the relevant mechanics of change in social environments. 
Countering this charge, the remainder of this article strives to show that both ideology-
critical conceptual engineering and other resources of ideology critique are not pointless or 
unhelpful for effecting and maintaining radical sociopolitical change, but of great value for 
such efforts. Let me begin this argument by unravelling in more detail what the arguments 
proposed so far already indicate: that transformative sociopolitical change and the successful 
engineering of fundamental political concepts like ‘freedom’ are mutually constitutive.  
De Dijn’s aforementioned book shows that, throughout the ages, what people understood 
freedom to mean was always heavily intertwined with shifting paradigms of political rule. 
Where the republics and democracies of antiquity retreated, moralistic conceptions of 
freedom as an inner virtue of wise men, whose strength remained unperturbed by outer 
turmoil or oppression, manifested widely (as did the anti-worldly ideologies of organized 
religion).48 Conversely, where people rose up against tyrants or autocrats, freedom often 
 
47 Cf. Haslanger, “Going on, Not in the Same Way”, p. 236. 
48 De Dijn, Freedom, p. 60-68, 111-125. 
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came to describe a democratic way of life without arbitrary superiors or insubordination.49 
Once again, actors sometimes (re-)discovered such conceptual possibilities and built radical 
change in public culture on its back; other times, conceptual improvement seems to have 
followed democratic achievements. The directionality of these processes is not very clear, 
but I think that we are in a good position to suggest a clearer structure to such 
directionalities using the insights already unearthed. On a closer look, a picture of the 
mutual constitution of conceptual change and transformative sociopolitical change, 
conceptual entrenchment and the stabilising of sociopolitical orders emerges.  
It is a central task of ideology-critical theory to lay the groundwork for sweeping change by 
providing genealogical efforts to debunk ideological freedom-concepts and discourse in 
order to raise consciousness about naturalisations and the distortions which underpin them. 
But we have seen that it is only transformational social change itself which enables 
widespread uptake of a nonideological freedom concept containing the newly engineered 
content motivating progressive action, because concepts play functional roles in their 
environments, and new concepts are thus only functional in adjusted environments. If and 
once they have achieved significant uptake, however, social kind concepts make themselves 
accurate over time, reflecting and stabilising changed social facts through increasing 
conceptual entrenchment. Our newly minted emancipatory order, thus, ought to remain 
committed to conceptual upkeep as well as to precluding ideology creep, where our own 
previously ideology-free concept becomes inundated with manifest naturalisations and 
obscures social power relations.50 This necessitates a fostering of our ameliorated conceptual 
landscape. In this way, anti-ideological freedom-amelioration and emancipatory 
sociopolitical change are mutually constitutive, as one ultimately depends on the other. 
This web of relations raises a host of questions about the character of political change and 
political strategy. After all – as Sankaran would have expected – I have had little to say 
about the ways in which we can get from undesirable sociopolitical orders to desirable – and 
emancipatory – sociopolitical orders via transformative change (or what could be strong 
candidate reasons to refrain from trying). A comprehensive answer to such questions is 
indeed beyond the scope of this paper, and beyond the scope of the armchair in general. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that ideology critique has intrinsic resources to 
contribute to guiding the real-world efforts of agents of change. Its task is not merely to 
develop a theory of conceptual amelioration and its interactions with real-world 
environment change, and then let the appropriate agents of change take it from there. 
 
49 Ibid, chs. 3-4. 
50 I say more about precluding ideology creep in section V. 
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Instead, ideology-critique can provide distinctive aid to practical endeavours of effecting 
change and erecting emancipatory orders. 
Ben Laurence has recently argued that nonideal theory’s endeavours of diagnosing unjust 
structures and outcomes – such as the role ideological freedom-discourse can play in 
upholding what we deem to be oppressive social relations – as well as prescribing 
appropriate remedies are intimately entangled with the question of the agents of change, 
agents “for whom intentionally bringing about change is feasible, and for whom it is realistic 
to think that they might come to do so willingly”.51 When it comes to building non-
ideological (emancipatory) and desirable sociopolitical orders on the back of improved 
freedom concepts, ideology critique is in a good position to identify suitable agents of change 
and engage with them in a dialectical process of mutual improvement. First, the debunking 
process of conceptual analysis unearths the roles ideological concepts play in advantaging 
some groups (and their interests) over others, and its heavily empirically informed 
genealogical efforts identify whose concerns are being elevated over whose. Thus, those 
marginalized groups who will likely be motivated to spur change can be identified. To 
illustrate this, think about a hypothetical analysis of the specific ways freedom-concepts have 
historically facilitated the continuing economic and political dominance of wealthy owners of 
the means of production in a particular society of advanced capitalism. Were one to 
conclude, for instance, that social discourses there identify freedom with absence of state 
interference and use of private monetary resources to establish social and political influence 
and thereby make ‘freedom’ play a facilitating function for class-based dominance, one could 
further identify both the social groups most disadvantaged by this hegemonic discursive 
practice – workers of some specified sort – and the organized subset of this group best 
positioned to attempt the transformation of social circumstances.  
The ideology-critical ambition of positive freedom-amelioration, as we have learned, must 
categorically be part of a large-scale project of societal transformation. In this sense, 
secondly and highly related to the first point just made, our ideology critique formulates a 
clear appeal to all those marginalized actors who propagate for change (and their allies) to 
work in concert, but sends the clearest mandate to get to work to those collective agents 
with the greatest organizational capacities to push for radical change. This suggests that the 
 
51 Ben Laurence, “The question of the agent of change”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 28 (2020), 355-77, at p. 
374. Note that on this account, emphasizing as it does feasibility and motivation, the appropriate agents of 
change are not necessarily those who have the most stringent moral obligations to spur change. For a pertinent 
account on particular agents’ moral obligations to transform conceptual practice, see Paul-Mikhail Catapang 




agents of change in question are akin to what Lea Ypi has termed ‘avantgarde political 
actors’: agents and organizations at the vanguard of political activism, especially those 
“whose position in society renders them particularly vulnerable to the effects of specific 
political and institutional conflicts and therefore particularly relevant in informing the 
theorist’s diagnostic inquiry”.52 Once identified, such actors, as the collective representation 
of those whose interests’ are primarily at stake, should thus also be mobilised to help 
sharpen ideology critics’ debunking efforts with the particular insights generated from their 
situated knowledge. In turn, as we shall see below, the theoretical resources of ideology 
critics contribute to guiding such agents of change towards emancipation; they can provide 
counsel to ensure that the agents’ own narratives keep from slipping into ideological 
territory, especially as such agents amass more power. These two facets of cooperation may 
generate an emancipatory dialectic. In sum, ideology critique as described here incorporates 
intrinsic tools for identifying proper agents of change; its theorizing process ought to be 
aided by such agents; and its analyses can go on to carry significant import for guiding 
agents towards achieving and maintaining emancipatory orders. Pace Sankaran, ideology 
critique has an important role to play in identifying and aiding the mechanics of 
environmental change, where such change necessitates large-scale social transformation. 
 
V. 
One crucial question is yet to be answered. Earlier, I have asked not only how and if we can 
establish new meanings of ‘freedom’; but also if and how we can do so without eventually 
falling back into ideology, sustaining our preferred sociopolitical orders only by ourselves 
obscuring the discursive roles ‘freedom’ really plays in buttressing our maintenance of power. 
This problem is enormously important since, ex hypothesi, truly emancipatory social relations 
are incompatible with ideological discourse. It becomes even more vexing once we consider 
that we do not have obvious historical models of nonideological discursive spheres: We 
would be hard-pressed to point to a particular epoch or circumstance in history in which 
ideology-free social and power relations were successfully erected and sustained (at least on 
a scale as grand as we target here). It seems, indeed, that we simply do not know how to 
construct an order “so devoid of the need to conceal its real power dynamics so as to afford 
an unclouded view of human relations”.53 Sooner rather than later, progressively 
transformed orders will face a reality check: reactionary forces will want to turn back the 
 
52 Lea Ypi, Global Justice & Avant-Garde Political Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at p. 5. 
53 Enzo Rossi, “Being realistic and demanding the impossible”, Constellations, 26 (2019), 638-52, at p. 646-47. 
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clock, or others might share ‘emancipatory’ ends but fundamentally disagree with us about 
what emancipation entails, and our order will thus become contested. Is it really possible for 
our hypothetical order to politically resist such challenges without making use of the 
powerful weapon of ideological distortion? 
I will not be able to displace this worry about ‘ideology creep’ confidently: it warrants a 
longer examination which I do not here have space for. Nonetheless, it is important to at 
least give a preliminary indication as to where we could find the resources for successfully 
countering it. Doing so further illustrates the distinct contributions of ideology critique to 
making transformational sociopolitical change both possible and desirable, and justifies my 
earlier claim that ideology critique incorporates theoretical resources which help agents of 
change avoid engaging in ideological distortion.  
There are, I think, two main considerations to stress: first, the importance of forming a clear 
notion of what it means to live in an emancipatory sociopolitical order, and second, the 
importance of identifying the appropriate ways of getting there. First, reason for hope arises 
from the possibility that ideology critics may influence emancipatory movements so that 
they understand their task primarily (or at least significantly) as one of changing discursive 
environments (and the concepts they include) to the effect that widespread awareness of the 
ubiquity of ideological distortion and an imperative to avoid producing it becomes society’s 
discursive foundation. Understanding the emancipatory task in this way may position the 
relevant actors to be more sensitive to the production of ideological distortion (and more 
hesitant to embrace it), and should help create an informed and vigilant citizenry which both 
takes normative issue with ideology and is not easily fooled by it. On this view, then, 
ideology critics may function to influence agents of change to understand the effort of 
emancipation itself at least in (necessary) part as the creation of “a fragile social experiment” 
in which epistemic transparency is assigned special value.54 
Second, ideology critique’s emphasis on the necessity to build sociopolitical structures 
resistant to pervasive epistemic distortion advises agents of change to prepare for 
endeavours of society-wide transformation by engaging in experimental learning processes 
in smaller-scale environments. More precisely, it counsels that abilities to counteract and 
abstain from the production of ideological ‘freedom’-discourse – and to create the right 
conditions for a project of widespread ideology-awareness to take hold – will be greatly 
enhanced if emancipatory agents engage first in the smaller-scale, experimental alternative-
 
54 Mathias Thaler, “Hope Abjuring Hope: On the Place of Utopia in Realist Political Theory”, Political Theory, 
46:5 (2018), 671-97, at p. 688. 
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building of prefigurative politics. Such politics are prefigurative because they strive for the 
construction of alternative, emancipatory ways of living on a smaller scale, hoping that the 
lessons learned there can then inform society-wide sociopolitical transformation (Marxian 
leftists point to a wide array of collectives as examples, such as the Occupy movement or the 
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria aka Rojava).55 The hope is that the engagement of 
transformative actors in building prefigurative political structures with a particular eye 
towards debunking ideological ‘freedom’ discourse and practising emancipation as ideology-
awareness equips them, where the challenges are fewer and the stakes lower, with tools, 
strategies, and lasting motivation to pursue large-scale change on the basis of epistemic 
accuracy and transparency. Through prefigurative politics, that is, we can couple the 
insurgent critique of dominant orders’ ideological ways with a newfound awareness of how 
to deal with the ideological potentials posed by our own dominant narratives, and learn how 
to respond to these potentials in emancipatory ways. While emancipatory actors cannot 
change what ‘freedom’ means for society-at-large as long as they stay within the confines of 
prefigurative structures, the political preparation afforded by collective organisation within 
those structures may be integral to their success in eventually keeping improved ‘freedom’-
discourse ideology-free. Once again, ideology critique has salient resources to guide the 
production of transformative sociopolitical change. 
 
VI. 
Let’s take stock. I argued in this paper that there is a relation of mutual constitution between 
transformative sociopolitical change and change in the dominant meanings of fundamental 
political concepts such as ‘freedom’. Presuming that emancipatory futures are futures in 
which prevailing power relations are legitimated by ideology-free processes of social 
justification, I argued further that progressive actors striving for such futures have strong 
reason to deploy ideology critique in order to, first, examine currently dominant meanings 
of ‘freedom’ and, second, engineer and implement alternative meanings suitable to aid the 
stabilisation of more desirable sociopolitical orders in ideology-free ways. The first task 
becomes necessary for the analysis of current circumstances, where dominant ‘freedom’ 
concepts may be ideological in the sense that they are constructed and reproduced as 
 
55 Paul Raekstad, „Revolutionary practice and prefigurative politics: A clarification and defense”, Constellations, 
25 (2018), 359-72; Rossi, “Being realistic and demanding the impossible”, at p. 648. The seminal academic 
attempt at proposing, exploring, and analysing structures of prefigurative politics is found in Erik Olin 
Wright’s Real Utopias Project. See, importantly, Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso, 
2010). For a general overview, see The Real Utopias Project, Available at: 
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hegemonic naturalisations that function to sustain prevailing power relations. I showed the 
importance of debunking such naturalisations and highlighting how they are different from 
the discursively operative meanings of the concept: the task is to unveil the reigning 
functions of ‘freedom’ for sustaining prevalent power relations through careful genealogical 
reconstruction. The second task results from the mutually constitutive relation between 
radical sociopolitical change and change in fundamental political concepts. Where we strive 
to overcome current conditions and erect radically alternative orders marked by 
emancipatory justificatory processes, we must effect large-scale political transformation 
which will in turn be stabilised by an improved ‘freedom’ concept of widespread uptake. 
Ideology critique helps make such endeavours both feasible and desirable. It helps identify 
the appropriate agents of change, insists that their principles and projects of emancipation be 
built around the central tenets of ideology-awareness and epistemic transparency, and 
counsels that radical transformation be put to the test in structures of prefigurative politics 
before society-wide transformative change is attempted, so that avoiding the ever-present 
danger that agents of change fall back into the very ideology they fought against is at the 
front and centre of emancipatory politics. 
